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Abstract 
The paper examines the debate over the legal position of Islamist party for-
mation through comparing views of two preeminent Muslim thinkers: M.S.R al-Būtī 
(antagonist) and Yūsuf al-Qaradāwī (protagonist). Using a text-by-text scheme, the pa-
per tests the validity of the cited textual evidences on the basis of the primary sources of 
Sharī‘a and the experience of today’s Islamists: the Muslim Brotherhood (parent organ-
ization),  Hizb al-Tahrīr, and the Justice and Development Party (AKP). Finally, the 
paper contends that Islamist parties are a system, accredited by Islamic principles, and a 
reality imposed by changing circumstances of Muslim nations in history, culture, and 
politics. 
 
Keywords: al-Būtī, al-Qaradāwī, Islamist, party, political, formation, the 
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Abstrak 
Kertas ini membincangkan kedudukan pembentukan parti-parti Islam dengan 
membandingkan pandangan dua cendiakawan Muslim terkemuka iaitu: M.S.R al-Būtī 
(antagonis) dan Yūsuf al-Qaradāwī (protagonis). Dengan menggunakan skema ayat 
dengan ayat, kertas ini mengkaji kesahihan bukti teks yang dirujuk berdasarkan Sharī'a 
dan pengalaman para Islamis pada hari ini seperti Ikhwanul Muslimin (organisasi in-
duk), Hizb al-Tahrīr, dan Parti Keadilan dan Pembangunan (AKP). Akhirnya, kertas ini 
menyimpulkan bahawa parti-parti Islam adalah satu sistem, yang berlandaskan prinsip-
prinsip Islam, dan juga satu kenyataan yang dikenakan oleh perubahan keadaan negara-
negara Islam dalam sejarah, budaya, dan politik. 
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Introduction 
Islamist parties have been a subject of considerable debate, par-
ticularly in the wake of the Arab uprisings of 2011. This brought Islam-
ists to the forefront of the political landscape in a number of countries, 
including Egypt and Tunisia. Part of the debate relates to whether it is 
permissible or not to create an Islamist party that, while playing accord-
ing to the rules of the political game, operates within the existing politi-
cal system and fields candidates for parliamentary elections. 
Generally, the Salafī movement is known to be the main oppo-
nent of the phenomenon of Islamist parties.
1
  This view is in line with a 
group of traditional/conservative contemporary writers like al-
Mubārakfūrī (India),2 Subhī Sa‘īd (Egypt), Kalīm al-Siddīqī (Pakistan),3 
and M. S. R. al-Būtī (Syria). In contrast, a great number of eminent intel-
lectuals and neo-traditionalists support the multi-party system with par-
ticular reference to Islamist parties across the political spectrum. Fore-
most among this camp are al-Qaradāwī,4 Huwaydī,5 ‘Amārah,6 al-‘Awwā 
(Egypt),
 7
 al-Ghannūshī (Tunisia), 8 and al-Turābī (Sudan).9  
                                                          
1
 See for example Bakr ibn Abdullah Abū Zayd, Hukm al-intimā’ ilā al-firaq wa al-
ahzāb  wa al-jamā‘āt Islamiyyah, (Saudi Arabia: n.p., 1410AH). Eminent Salafī schol-
ars, like al-‘Uthaymīn, Fawzān, al-Albānī, prohibited creating or joining Islamist par-
ties. See their fatwas at this site, accessed April 5, 2016, 
  <http://www.alrbanyon.com/vb/showthread.php?t=5029>.  
However, ‘Abd al-Rahmān ‘Abd al-Khāliq, an eminent Salafī, supports different kinds 
of political blocs, on the basis of 'public interest.' i.e. they are neither imposed nor pro-
hibited by Islamic sources. See his book Al-Muslimūn wa al-‘amal al-siyāsī, (Kuwait: 
Dār al-Salafiyyah, 1985), 27-28.   
2
 Safī al-Rahmān al-Mubārakfūrī, Al-Ahzāb al-Islamiyyah fī al-Islam, (Rābitat al-
Jāmi‘āt al-Islamiyyah: Matba‘āt al-Madīnah, 1987). 
3
 Al-Ghannūshī, Al-Hurriyāt al-‘āmmah, 288. 
4
 Yūsuf al-Qara_āwī, Min fiqh al-dawlah fī al-Islam. (3rd ed). (Cairo: Dār al-Shurūq, 
2001), 147-160. 
5
 Fahmī Huwaydī, Al-Islam wā al-dīmuqrātiyyah, (Cairo: Al-Ahrām, 1993). 
6
 Muhammad ‘Amārah, Hal al-Islam huwā al-hal?, (Cairo: Dār al-Shurūq, 1995), 86-
92;  Al-Islam wā huqūq al-Insān, (Kuwait: ‘Ālam al-Ma‘rifah, 1985), 90-92. 
7
 Muhammad Salīm al-‘Awwā,  Fī  al-nizām al-siāysī li  al-dawlah al-Islamiyyah, (Cai-
ro: Dār al-Shurūq, 2006), 73-75. 
8
 Al-Ghannūshī, Al-Hurriyāt al-‘āmmah, 248-196. 
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Although Islamist parties are now a living reality, and Islamist 
participation in elections is apparent in a variety of countries (i.e. Jordan, 
Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, Turkey, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, etc.),
10
 
there exist those, significant in number, who count Islamist parties with 
all their political platforms as trivial at best and null and void at worst.  
   Accordingly, and for a better appreciation of textual evidences 
and applied methods, the paper attempts to examine the contested views 
of the debate via a selective study of two leading Muslim scholars of to-
day: al-Būtī and al-Qaradāwī. The rationale behind this choice is that, 
besides being skilled articulators of the debate, the two peers represent a 
unique case of symmetry and dissymmetry.  
Both of al-Būtī and al-Qaradāwī, recognized as highly esteemed 
religious thinkers, contributed substantially to Muslim scholarship. Their 
books, essays, and treatises on a wide range of traditional Muslim disci-
plines, as well as a host of contemporary religious, social, and intellectual 
issues, gained currency across the Arab and Muslim worlds. 
 As long as contentious topics like 'political Islam' and 'armed re-
bellion' are concerned,  the two scholars display different, at times con-
frontational, views. While al-Būtī, for over three decades, developed a 
discourse that discredits Islamism and criticizes Islamist groups for dog-
matic beliefs, al-Qaradāwī has been an Islamist himself — of the Muslim 
Brotherhood.   
On the other hand, after the outbreak of the 2011 uprisings in Syr-
ia, al-Būtī upheld a position that was widely interpreted as a pro-regime 
stance. Initially he banned protests, urging demonstrators to not follow 
"calls of unknown sources that want to exploit mosques to incite sedi-
tions and chaos in Syria."
11
 With rebels pulling the trigger, al-Būtī 
viewed the Revolution as both religiously illegitimate and politically ori-
ented thereby creating, even after his tragic end,
12
 an ongoing debate not 
                                                                                                                                              
9
 Hasan al-Turābī, Al-Siāysah wa al-hukm, (Beirut: Arab Scientific Publishers, 2011), 
159-192. According to Huwaydī,  Al-Islam wā al-dīmuqrātiyyah, 76, two hundred Mus-
lim thinkers expressed their support of political pluralism in a statement published in a 
book entitled, Ro’yah Islamiyyah mu‘āsirah, (Cairo: Dār al-Shurūq, 1992).   
10
 Khalil Al-Anani, “Islamist Parties Post Arab Springs,” Mediterranean Politics, 17, 
no. 3(November 2012), 466-472.   
11
 “Sheikh al-Bouti, the Syrian Sunni cleric who stood by Assad. ”  (2013) alarabiya.net, 
accessed September 14, 2014, 
<http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/2013/03/22/-Sheikh-al-Bouti-the-Syrian-Sunni-
cleric-who-stood-by-Assad.html> 
12
 Al-Būtī was horrifically assassinated (March 21, 2013) in a bomb attack while deliv-
ering a regular religious lecture in al-Imān Mosque (Damascus), with reportedly more 
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only in Syria but also in the Muslim world. 
13
 Al-Qaradāwī, in striking 
contrast, appeared to be a staunch advocate of the 2010 ‘Arab Spring’ in 
general and of the Syrian Revolution in particular.
14
  
This war of ideas created an assumed dichotomy of ‘the state ju-
rist’ and ‘the revolution jurist.’  While the former makes it mandatory to 
obey the ruler, prohibits the armed revolt against them, and rejects the 
modern means of political action and opposition, the latter attempts to 
formulate a comprehensive Islamic system vs. the Socialist and Capitalist 
thought and further rediscovers the traditional Islamic-political heritage 
in light of modern ideas about state, politics, democracy, and freedom.
15
 
The text-by-text strategy is the chosen organizational scheme of the pa-
per. After presenting the different treatments of the subject, the paper 
will evaluate the textual evidences, along with strengths and weaknesses. 
                                                                                                                                              
than 42 casualties. This was also another unsettled issue leading to mutual recrimination 
between the regime and the opposition. 
13
 For writings against al-Būtī see for example Thomas Pierret, Religion and State in 
Syria. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 218-220; Mu‘taz al-Khatīb, 
“Al-faqīh wa al-dawlah fī al-thawrāt al-‘arabiyyah,” Tabayyun Magazine. N0. 3/9 
(Summer 2014): 63-84; Ghāzī al-Tawbah, “Sifāt al-‘ālim: al-Būtī  namūdhajan 
ma‘kūsan, ” (2012). aljazeera.net, accessed September 27, 2014. < 
http://www.aljazeera.net/knowledgegate/opinions. > 
On writings supporting al-Būtī see Muwaffaq al-Khālid, “Waqfah bayna al-sheikh Mu-
hammad Said Ramadan al-Būtī  wa muntaqidīh, ” (July 29, 2011), accessed September 
8, 2011. 
< 
http://www.naseemalsham.com/ar/Pages.php?page=readrticle&pg_id=17670&page1=1
U>; Nasūh al-Shāmī, “al-  Thawrah fī sharak al-istibdād, ” (August 8, 2011) , accessed 
September 8, 2011. 
  < 
http://www.naseemalsham.com/ar/Pages.php?page=readviestor&pg_id=18814&page1=
1U>. 
For articles attempting to strike a balance see ‘Abd al-Fattāh al-Hādī, “Shaikhunā al-
habīb al-‘allāmah al-ductūr al-Būtī bayn al-qādihīn wa al-mādhīn,” (March 23, 2013),  
accessed January 8, 2015. 
< http://arabic.alshahid.net/columnists/opinion/89324>. 
14
 Strikingly, al-Qaradāwī, before the Arab Spring, was following the majority of earlier 
‘ulama who prohibited the armed revolt against the evil-doing Muslim ruler, because 
the amount of harm that would result from a rebellion is far greater than when he re-
mains in power. See his book Fiqh al-jihād. (Cairo: Maktabat Wahbah, 2009), 2: 1029-
1067. 
15
 See Mu‘taz al-Khatīb, “Al-faqīh wa al-dawlah fī al-thawrāt al-‘arabiyyah,” Tabayyun 
Magazine. N0. 3/9 (Summer 2014): 63-84. 
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This is done through the application of both discourses to the Muslim 
Brotherhood, the oldest and largest Islamist movement that reflects a 
myriad of different outlooks, coupled with two parties representing oppo-
site ends of the Islamic political spectrum - Hizb al-Tahrīr, and the Jus-
tice and Development Party (AKP). 
 
Definition of terms and concepts 
It is crucial to identify the key terms and concepts used in this 
study. ‘Political Islam’ or ‘Islamism,’16 with the abolition of the Islamic 
caliphate in 1924, became a reference point for a wide range of political 
groups and movements who believed that “a systematic implementation 
of the Shariah will once again restore global leadership and moral sover-
eignty to Muslims. They envisage an Islamic state as the vehicle that will 
re-implement Shariah in the lives of Muslims and re-establish Islam as a 
global force. ” 17 
‘Islamists’18/‘Islamist groups,’19 in the language of al-Būtī, are 
those who tend to intermingle da‘wah with politics, and when reaching 
power, impose rules of Sharī‘a from a position of authority,20 in addition 
to adopting extreme views leading to violent acts. In this context, al-Būtī 
names the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt
21
 and Syria,
22
 and Hizb al-
Tahrīr23 as groups falling into this category.  
                                                          
16
 There is no doubt that the term is loaded with numerous dimensions and various rami-
fications. See M. Mozaffari, “What is Islamism? History and Definition of a Concept”, 
Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions, 8:1, (2007) 17-33; Martin, R.C. & Bar-
zegar, A. Islamism: Contested Perspectives on political Islam. (Stanford: Stanford Uni-
versity Press, 2010).  
17
 Muqtedar Khan, “What is Political Islam? ” (March 10, 2014).  E-International Rela-
tions, accessed July 25, 2015.> http://www.e-ir.info/2014/03/10/what-is-political-
islam/<. See Ahmad Moussalli. Moderate and Radical Islamic Fundamentalism: The 
Quest for Modernity, Legitimacy, and the Islamic State (Florida: University Press of 
Florida, 1999); M. A. Muqtedar Khan, “Islamic States” in Mary Hawkesworth and 
Maurice Kogan Eds. Encyclopedia of Government and Politics, (New York: Taylor and 
Francis, 2004). 
18
 Al-Būtī, Al-Jihad fī al-Islam. (Damascus: Dār al-Fikr, 1993), 172; and his book Wa 
hādhihī mushkilātunā. (4th ed.). (Damascus: Dār al-Fikr, 1995), 48, 58.    
19
 Al-Būtī, Wa hādhihī mushkilātunā, 45,49. 
20
 Ibid., 45-47. 
21
 Al-Būtī, Al-Jihad fī al-Islam, 171. 
22
 Ibid.,  172.  
23
 Hishām ‘Ilīwān  and Fādī al-Ghūsh.  Al-Būtī, wa al-jihad wa al-Islam al-siāys, (Bei-
rut: Markaz al-Hadārah li Tanmiyat al-Fikr al-Islamī, 2012), 131-132. 
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With regards to ‘Islamist parties’ vs. ‘Islamist movements,’ it is 
hard to set clear boundaries between the two terms, given their socio-
religious and political ramifications. ‘Islamist movements’ (or groups) 
have multiple forms and faces, ranging from civil society organizations 
providing health services, to extreme terrorist networks or apolitical mis-
sionary activists. What they all have in common is the claim that Islam is 
the source of their identity and behavior.
24
 On the basis of their thought 
and behavior, ‘Islamist parties’ are political formations that have accept-
ed to work according to the rules of political norms and participate in the 
electoral system.
25
 Most Islamist parties also advocate for social justice, 
pluralism, democratic and liberal reforms, as well as human rights.
26
 
Unlike Islamist movements, some Islamist parties, like the AKP, might 
not claim an affinity with Islam, “but could pursue ‘Islamic politics’ by 
acting in conformity with the religious demands and concerns of the peo-
ple.”27  Driven by internal factors, some Islamist movements tend to form 
parties, whiles others do not.
28
  
 
Al-Būtī’s View 
Al-Būtī ’s discourse on Islamists is twofold: on the one hand, he 
notes, within the literature and activities of some contemporary Islamist 
movements, several religious views that are reflective of misquotation 
and misapplication of the Islamic law.
29
 Also, al-Būtī posits that, instead 
                                                          
24
 Esen Kirdiş, "Between Movement and Party: Islamic Political Party Formation in 
Morocco, Turkey and Jordan" (Unpublished PhD dissertation, the University of  Minne-
sota, Minneapolis, 2011), 13-14. 
25
 For examples see Mohammed Ayoob, “Political Islam: Image and Reality,” Political 
Islam, Ed. Barry Rubin. Routledge. 1: 51. The article is originally published in World 
Policy Journal, 21, no. 3 (Fall 2004): 1-14. 
26
 It is shown later that Hizb al-Tahrīr, although an Islamist party, never subscribes to 
any of these values. 
27
 Hakan Yavuz, Secularism and Muslim Democracy. (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 2009), 8.  
28
 Kirdiş, vii argues that movement with a vanguard mobilization strategy, in which a 
small group of leaders frame the cause and mobilize masses around an Islamic identity, 
tend to establish parties. In contrast, movements with a grassroots mobilization strategy 
in which the aim is to construct mass consciousness through grassroots activities tend to 
remain outside of formal politics, eschewing party formation.  
29
 I have conducted a study named “The Anti-Islamist Course: The Case of al-Būtī,” 
which identifies seven issues with Islamists according to al-Būtī. Having presented and 
evaluated al-Būtī’s views, the study further attempts to examine whether they are appli-
cable to contemporary movements or not. The study will be published by al-Shajarah, 
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of following the demanding and long journey of da‘wah with its various 
paths and forms, many Islamists prefer to take a short cut by seizing state 
power, and consequently imposing Islam from a position of authority.
30
 
As I argue, al-Būtī’s discourse on those particular concepts deserves to 
be taken as a yardstick, against which a clear distinction is made between 
extreme and moderate Islamist movements.
31
 
On the other hand, according to al-Būtī, several issues are associated 
with creating or joining Islamist parties: (i) the relationship among party 
members, which over time becomes stronger and deeper than that of the 
rest of the Muslim community, is ultimately based on a sort of partisan 
attitude, with this interest group neither serving to unite Muslims nor fos-
tering the Qur’ānic principle “The believers indeed are brothers.” 32  (The 
Qur’ān, 49: 10); 
(ii) Needless to say, Islam, a vital and shaping force in personal and pub-
lic life, is deeply entrenched in numerous societies. Therefore, the call for 
Islamist party formation is per se an enterprise of considerable attraction. 
So, al-Būtī has no doubt that if he announces the launch of a new Islamist 
party, hundreds of thousands of Muslims will hasten to join it; however, 
in addition to the party’s faithful members, a group of political as well as 
non-political sycophants will jump on the bandwagon. They are ready to 
grow their beards and show commitment to Islamic norms for the sake of 
political gain. Once assuming power, they turn their backs on this poor 
Islamist party. 
33
 “This is not a fantasy,” al-Būtī goes on, “Actually, there 
is no Islamist party but half of its members or more are of this kind of 
people who, having joined the party, came to a well-trodden path towards 
achieving their own political interests;”34  
 (iii) Islamic activists are pulled into face-to-face encounters with other 
conflicting parties. These encounters are bound to create political polari-
zation, where Islamists have two choices: either to identify with a partic-
ular political party or to keep themselves aloof. In the latter case, a joint 
                                                                                                                                              
Journal of the International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization (ISTAC), in 
the June issue, 2018. 
30
 Al-Būtī, Wa hādhihī mushkilātunā, 47. 
31
 Bachar Bakour, “The Anti-Islamist Discourse, ” 
32
 Ma‘al-Būtī fī hayātihī wa fikrih, interview with al-Būtī. 2009. Al-Sham TV. No.4,   
accessed February 8, 2014. 
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UZSHtD9jQ0w&list=PLScN5nWtR4PMWhnMW
_E69llOKkar-u6PH&index=9>   
33
 Ibid. 
34
 Ibid. Al-Būtī here does not mention sources or give statistics to support his argument.  
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attack from other parties is anticipated. 
35
 Affected by these conflicting 
currents, those Islamists feel obliged to move from da‘wah propagators 
to political activists who are determined to win a decisive victory against 
their opponents;
36
 
(iv) da‘wah, al-Būtī argues, is eliminated by political activity rather than 
enhanced by it. “As a political activist, I fail to convince the president or 
any government official that my advice to him is sincere and for the sake 
of God, because both of us are political rivals who run for office. Yet, 
when realizing that I am not interested in power, he is likely to listen to 
me. ” 37  
For the reasons above, al-Būtī, in spite of frequent offers,38 re-
mained resolutely opposed to creating his own political party based on 
‘moderate’ Islam. Once he turned down a proposal to represent Muslim 
forces in the National Progressive Front of Syria. In justification of the 
decline, he explained that this representation means Islam would share 
influence and power with the rest of the Front’s members. By implica-
tion, the central role of Islam would be reduced to a mere political com-
petitor, and this would bring Islam to its own destruction. 
39
  
Then, al-Būtī added that Islam is the common denominator in the 
Front’s various members, who consider Islam a sense of belonging — 
historical, cultural, or national, if not religious. Therefore, Islam as a 
common identity, so to speak, should not be reduced to a political oppo-
nent.
40
  
Alternatively, al-Būtī lays a particular emphasis on the presence 
of Islamic norms and teachings in the public sphere, rather than in the 
realm of politics. He maintains that it was the ‘educational’ Islam, rather 
than the ‘political,’ which conquered the early Muslims’ heart and 
remolded their soul by way of the gradual and constant process of self-
purification, which never occurred overnight. Thereupon, all various 
challenges and obstacles were removed by the force of Muslims’ firm 
                                                          
35
 Al-Būtī, Wa hādhihī mushkilātunā, 52.  
36
 Ibid.   
37
 ma‘al-Būtī fī qadāyā al-sā‘a; cf. al-Būtī, Wa hādhihī mushkilātunā, 55. 
38
 ma‘al-Būtī fī hayātihī wa fikrih,  
39
 Al-Būtī, Al-Jihad fī al-Islam, 66; See ‘Ilīwān and al-Ghūsh, al-Būtī, wa al-jihad, 126-
127.   
40
 Al-Būtī, Al-Jihad fī al-Islam, 66.   
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intellectual belief coupled with passionate love, and glorification of Is-
lam.
41
 
 
 
 
Al-Qaradāwī’s View 
To al-Qaradāwī, a practicing Islamist, the idea of Islamist parties 
is taken for granted. Therefore, he has given more attention to salient fea-
tures of Islamic revival and to creating a blueprint for a viable Islamist 
project. For this purpose, al-Qaradāwī outlines the Muslim Brothers’ per-
ception of sound Islamic education in theory and practice.
42
 While exam-
ining the Islamic resurgence phenomenon, al-Qaradāwī sets the course 
right by offering an in-depth treatment to topical issues. For example, in 
a volume he deals with the dogma of religious extremism, its repercus-
sions and prescribes the antidote for it.
43
 Elsewhere he draws the line be-
tween commendable difference and schismatic dispute,
44
 in addition to 
other various topics.
45
 His book “The Priorities of the Islamist movement 
in the Next Phase”46 provides illuminating insights to the Islamic resur-
gence with particular reference to Islamist movements. For al-Qaradāwī, 
these are the actual issues that are worth debate and investigation, rather 
than the legal status of Islamist parties. On various occasions however, 
the existential issue of the latter has to be under discussion.       
In his response to an enquiry about the accurate position of 
Sharī‘a on Islamist party formation, al-Qaradāwī argues that, God created 
human beings with a whole range of different beliefs, languages, cus-
toms, interests, etc., and party formation is not an exception to this natu-
ral diversity.
47
 In response to those who see the very notion of parties ne-
                                                          
41
 Al-Būtī, Al-Islam wa al-‘asr, 25-28; ‘Ilīwān and al-Ghūsh, al-Būtī, wa al-jihad, 126.   
42
 Al-Qaradāwī, Al-Tarbiyah al-Islamiyyah wa madrasat Hasan al-Banna, (2nd ed). 
(Cairo: Maktabat Wahbah, 1982). 
43
 Al-Qaradāwī, Al-Sahwah  al-Islamiyyah bayna al-jumūd wa al-tatarruf,  (12th ed). 
(Cairo: Dār al-Shurūq, 2001). The first edition appeared in 1402 AH.  
44
 Al-Qaradāwī, Al-Sahwah al-Islamiyyah bayna al-ikhtilāf al-mashrū ‘ wa al-tafarruq 
al-mathmūm, (Cairo: Dār al-Shurūq, 2001). 
45
 Al-Qaradāwī, Al-Sahwah  al-Islamiyyah min al-murāhaqah ilā al-rushd,  (3rd ed). 
(Cairo: Dār al-Shurūq, 2008); Al-Sahwah  al-Islamiyyah wa humūm al-watan al-‘arabi 
wa al-Islami, (2
nd
 ed). (Cairo: Maktabat Wahbah, 1997). 
46
 Al-Qaradāwī, Awlayiāāt al-harakah al-Islamiyyah fī al-marhalah al-qādimah, (Beru-
it: Mu’assasat al-Risālah, 2001). 
47
 Al-Qaradāwī, Min fiqh al-dawlah, 153.   
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gates the scriptural call for Muslim unity,
48
 al-Qaradāwī clarifies that the 
Qur’ān and Sunnah denounce only schismatic differences that come out 
of partisan attitude or end up in conflict and sedition. Islamist Parties, 
however, are a product of natural differences, which although speak a 
common language of shared references, appreciate juristic nuances with-
in the boundaries of the Sharī‘a political system. 49  
To al-Qaradāwī, pluralism is recognized if it reflects different 
thoughts, trends and policies, and does not partake of racist, regional, or 
social divisions.
50
 He then gives examples on legal opinions that can be 
viewed differently by a group of revivalist vs. traditional Islamists. The 
former subscribes to the following issues: shūra is binding, the president 
can run for a second term, women’s suffrage, their right to be MPs, the 
state may implement price controls on essential items, peace is the basis 
of foreign relations, etc. The latter, however, has a different line of 
thought. A third group probably exists as well. 
51
  Comparatively speak-
ing, those parties are schools of opinion in the realm of politics, similar 
to a host of traditional schools of jurisprudence, which are held as a 
healthy phenomenon.
52
  
On the other hand, it goes without saying that the ummah is re-
quired to command what is right and forbid what is evil before a corrupt 
ruler.
53
  Having cited several traditions on the merit of carrying out this 
ethical-religious concept, even at times by force, al-Qaradāwī admitted 
that it is extremely hard to bring a ruler back to the right path by rebel-
lion. This is learned from history and Muslims’ experiences of today. 54 
The antidote, according to al-Qaradāwī, is to undertake change through 
nonviolent means without causing bloodshed. Nowadays, the best formu-
la for doing this change is via political forces or parties. Governments 
                                                          
48
 Abū Zayd, Hukm al-intimā’ 89-95; al-Ghannūshī, Al-Hurriyāt al-‘āmmah, 257; Salāh  
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may get rid of individuals or small groups, yet cannot ignore or belittle 
dissident voices of parties with deep embedment in the society. 
55
  
With regards to the question of loyalty (party/group partisanship), 
a distinction should be made between loyalty to God, His messenger, and 
the believers,
56
 which is taken for granted, and having a sense of belong-
ing to a certain group, association or party. The latter seems accepted if it 
is not in opposition to the tenets of Islam. What is forbidden, rather, is to 
show loyalty to disbelievers or to pledge unconditional allegiance to 
one’s party under all circumstances.57  
Historically speaking, there existed, within the body of the Islam-
ic state, the party of Kharijites — a fanatic group who broke away from 
the mainstream Muslim community after the fourth Caliph, Alī Ibn Abū  
Talib had accepted the arbitration.
58
 Although Kharijites constituted 
armed opposition, Alī neither excommunicated the Kharijites, expelled 
them from prayer in mosques, nor started fighting them.
59
  
As far as non-Islamist parties are concerned, al-Qaradāwī goes as far as 
allowing their establishment, within the Islamic state, provided they 
maintain healthy relations with Islam and do not intend to demolish its 
central tenets or have dubious ties with hostile countries or organiza-
tions.
60
 Based on that, parties with atheist/agnostic or pornographic pro-
clivity are rejected.
61
   
Before closing discussion on this topic, al-Qaradāwī expresses 
strong disapproval of two odd notions: The first prohibits all kinds of 
formation or alliance (party, group or movement).
62
 In addition to having 
no basis, this fatwa runs contrary to the widely-recognized legal maxim, 
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al-asl fī al-'ashyā’ al-’ibāhahÉ, (the rule for things and natural utilities is 
permissibility). It tacitly approves the notion of group formation, for fun-
damental sources of Sharī‘a are not in opposition to this phenomenon.63  
Joint effort/group work for promoting Islam and Muslim union has be-
come a religious obligation and a social necessity imposed by the reality 
of Muslims today.
64
  
The second notion champions party/group formation, yet singles 
out one group to be on the right path, with other groups/movements hav-
ing gone astray.
65
  Given the quintessence of the Muslim community, 
those who do not follow their path or accept their views are out of Is-
lam.
66
 Of course, such opinion suffers from parochial thinking and mis-
application of main Islamic sources.
67
 
 
Islamist Party Formation 
Al-Būtī: No Al-Qaradāwī: Yes 
1-Party partisanship 1-Islamist Parties are a product of 
natural difference, similar to tradi-
tional schools of jurisprudence 
2-Party is joined by political and 
non-political sycophants 
2-Commanding the right and forbid-
ding the evil before the ruler is best 
undertaken nowadays by formidable 
political forces 
3-Inevitable clash with contend-
ing parties 
3-Party phenomenon has precedents 
in Muslim history 
4-Political activism supersedes 
da‘wah 
4-The legal maxim, al-asl fī al-
'ashyā’ al-’ibāhah tacitly approves 
the notion of group formation 
 
Critical Assessment 
From the foregoing discussion, a few remarks are made: first of 
all, al-Būtī’s discourse on Islamist party formation is largely shaped by 
Badī‘ al-Zamān Sa‘īd al-Nūrsī, the Kurdish Islamic thinker (d. 1960). Al-
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Nūrsī, who left an unmistakable imprint on al-Būtī’s intellectual and spir-
itual life,
68
 participated himself in political action and came out with 
first-hand experience recalled by al-Būtī himself. 69  
After over two decades of political engagement and activity, al-
Nūrsī (in 1921) decided to desert politics altogether and dedicate the rest 
of his life to da‘wah instead.70 Showing remorse for earlier involvement 
in politics, al-Nūrsī said, ‘I seek refuge in God from Satan and politics.’71 
Interestingly, the reasons why he left politics are almost identical to those 
of al-Būtī’s.72 So, they reflect purely personal experience that occurred in 
the 1920s, rather than an outcome of statistical evidence or any other da-
ta-collection method. 
It cannot be denied that partisan attitudes, for instance, are found 
in the rhetoric of some Islamists, whether individuals (e.g. the Syrian 
Brother, Sa‘īd Hawwa), or groups (e.g. Al-Takfīr wa al-Hijrah). While 
the former believes that al-Ikhāwn is the only movement representing the 
true ummah, and thus a Muslim has no choice but to pledge allegiance to 
it,
73
 the latter excommunicates Muslims who do not follow their group or 
accept their ideas. 
74
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Nevertheless, this narrow-minded outlook by no means sub-
scribes to the thought of numerous Muslim Brothers,
75
 who consider 
themselves part of the mainstream Muslim community rather than the 
only Muslim community. 
In contrast to the clash theory proposed by al-Būtī, the coopera-
tion theory was there as well. The Muslim Brotherhood is a case in point. 
In 1984, the Brothers made an alliance with the secular Wafd Party, 
where they won 15% of the vote with eight seats solely belonging to the 
Muslim Brotherhood.
76
 In 1987, another alliance was reached with the 
Socialist Labor Party and the Liberal Party under the slogan al-Islam 
huwā al-hal (Islam is the Solution).77 This time, the Brothers won 36 
seats.
78
 
With reference to al-Būtī’s argument that political action abolish-
es da‘wah efforts, it is directly applicable to radical Islamist groups 
whose fanatical and primitive understanding of Islamic teachings have 
created a major obstacle to the cause of da‘wah. For example, Hizb al-
Tahrīr, founded by Taqī al-Dīn al-Nabhānī in Jerusalem in 1953, makes 
every endeavor to restore the Islamic Caliphate after removing the disbe-
lieving rulers.
79
 If the Caliphate is not re-instituted, all Muslim countries, 
including Makkah and Madīnah, will remain to be deemed the abode of 
kufr (disbelief).
80
 Unlike the majority of Islamist groups, Hizb al-Tahrīr 
never pay attention to Islamic moral and spiritual education.
81
 Daʿwah, to 
the party, is exclusively practiced through the prism of Politics.
82
 No 
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doubt, such rigid and narrow interpretations of Islam serve as a stumbling 
block to missionary Islam. 
The case with moderate Islamists, however, seems vastly differ-
ent. The AKP, founded in 2001 by Recep Tayyip Erdogan, is a good ex-
ample. Despite a genealogy that dates back to the tradition of Turkey’s 
Islamist political trend, the party does not prefer to describe itself as an 
'Islamist' party. The party leaders hold an accommodating approach to 
other secular or non-religious groups, and on the other hand, follow the 
gradual Islamization of society from ‘the bottom-up.’83 In doing so, they 
do not sacrifice da‘wah for politics; instead, they make politics subservi-
ent to da‘wah.  
For instance, Abdullah al-Nafīsī, Kuwaiti professor of political 
science, asked Erdogan after becoming the Prime Minister in 2003: 
“Now you are the prime minister who can make substantial change in the 
country. I have seen in the streets of Istanbul obscene practices that in-
jure Muslims’ feelings. So, what are you going to do?” Erdogan replied, 
“My prime concern now is the economic growth of the country and to 
bring Turkey back to the lab of the Islamic World. As for these obscene 
practices, they existed even at the Prophet’s time. The Prophet, however, 
rather than eliminating them, first worked on building up the foundations 
of Islam in the society. This is what we are going to do.”84  
Additionally, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt served the cause 
of da‘wah via non-governmental organizations, social service networks, 
charitable endowments, and publishing enterprises.
85
  In Syria, the 
movement opened a public Islamic library in Homs, a number of free 
schools for all ages, including schools for the illiterate, as well as stu-
dents’ scholarships, trips, conferences, lectures, and health clubs. 86  
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Finally and more importantly, in the Caliphate era, Islam had 
been the commanding source of identity, ideas and laws, as well as the 
governing doctrine of both the state and the society. Yet, in 1924, mark-
ing the collapse of the caliphate, Islam ceased to be the general frame-
work for the state. The post-colonial nation-states of the Arab world 
searched for a replacing identity under the banner of secularism, social-
ism, or nationalism. Islam, as a common identity, was relegated to the 
role of ‘bureaucratic Islam.’ Consequently, Islamic movements emerged 
with the aim of overcoming a perceived impasse in Muslim societies and 
reasserting original Islamic values. Nowadays, political parties all over 
the world become the mouthpiece of a countless number of socio-
economic philosophies, as well as religious and non-religious ideologies. 
Similarly, Muslims across the world have the right to express their reli-
gious views, and agendas via the same political platform. 
 
Conclusion 
Based on the above discussion and analysis, one may argue that 
the existence of Islamist parties holding different interpretations in Islam-
ic political theory indicates a rich, flexible, and adaptable mindset. Islam-
ist parties, deeply and durably entrenched in the fabric of society, are ex-
pected to promote social and economic development in the framework of 
the Sharī‘a. 
More importantly, a multi-party system is an effective mechanism 
by which people are better able to maintain their rights and freedoms, 
and on the other hand, are empowered to raise their voices against tyran-
nical governmental policies and procedures. This system is a civilized 
way for the transition of power via democratic systems without violence 
or bloodshed. 
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